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A commentary on
The geometry of expertise
by Leone, M. J., Slezak, D. F., Cecchi, G.
A., and Sigman, M. (2014). Front. Psychol.
5:47. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00047
Across many domains, experts make
decisions based on the spatial relationships of objects within an environment.
Firefighters, for example, need to evaluate the fire in front of them, radiologists
the medical scan, and chess players the
position on the chess board before making a decision. In order to be effective,
experts need to assess these spatial relationships quickly and despite possible
uncertainty. This ability is facilitated by
cognitive processes. According to the socalled chunking and template theories,
this expertise is made possible by pattern recognition (Gobet and Simon, 1996;
Gobet, 1997). Based on their experience
and practice, experts store in their longterm memory meaningful configurations
of elements (i.e., patterns—chunks or
templates) in their domain of expertise.
These patterns are associated with typical
decisions and strategies. Thus, when an
expert faces a situation in their domain
of expertise, they are able to rapidly recognize patterns, which, in turn, prompt
them to consider decisions or strategies
that have been effective in previous situations. This allows experts to make superior
decisions to novices who are limited to a
real-time search through a large number
of possible options (Feltovich et al., 2006;
Gobet and Charness, 2006; Connors et al.,
2011).
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Leone et al.’s (2014) elegant study adds
to existing evidence for this account. In
particular, Leone et al. demonstrate that
experts’ representation of space in their
domain of expertise is qualitatively different to that of novices. Leone et al. focused
on chess. Chess has the advantage of being
a constrained task environment with relatively high ecological validity to other
domains. Chess also has the advantage of a
precise measure of expertise in the form of
a numerical rating that is assigned to each
player on the basis of their performance
against their opponents. For these reasons, a large amount of expertise research
has examined chess (Gobet and Charness,
2006). For Leone et al.’s study, chess has
the additional advantage of having large
amounts of data available: Leone et al.
examined well over 175,000 games drawn
from an internet chess server.
Given experts’ pattern recognition ability, Leone et al. predicted that experts
should make moves that were best for the
position at hand and so not be constrained
by the mere physical distance between
objects. In contrast, novices would be
more likely to make moves based on spatial
proximity to previous moves due to their
relative lack of pattern recognition and
their need to conserve cognitive resources.
Leone et al. made four specific hypotheses.
First, the authors predicted that novices
should make moves that are closer to their
or their opponent’s previous move. To test
this, they developed a novel methodology in which they calculated the distance
between a player’s move and their previous
move, and the distance between a player’s
move and their opponent’s previous move.

Second, the authors predicted that novice
players would be more likely to move
the same piece multiple times. To test
this, they examined the frequency with
which players moved the same piece more
than once on consecutive turns. Third,
the authors predicted that novices would
be more likely to simplify the position
by exchanging pieces (capturing an opponent’s piece when the opponent can recapture their own piece), thereby reducing
the cognitive load of dealing with large
numbers of pieces. To test this, they examined the rate at which pieces were removed
from the board according to the number of moves in the game. Finally, the
authors predicted that novices would be
less likely to keep with general strategic
principles (e.g., knights are more effective when centralized) than experts. To
test this, they examined the frequency
with which pieces were placed in suitable
parts of the board (e.g., knights in central
regions).
Leone et al. found evidence for all
four hypotheses. First, novices were more
likely to move pieces that were closer to
their or their opponent’s previous move
than experts. Second, novices were more
likely to move the same piece on consecutive turns than experts. Third, novices
were more likely to simplify positions
than experts. Finally, novices were less
likely to keep to general strategic principles than experts. Although the relative
size of the effects were small, Leone et al.
demonstrated the robustness of the effects
across very large datasets and across games
of different durations. Similar differences
between experts and novices were evident
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regardless of whether players had a total of
3, 5, or 15 min each.
Although the authors did not directly
assess the quality of the players’ decisions,
their work provides evidence that experts
base their decision on what is most meaningful in a position, rather than being
limited by spatial proximity. As Leone
et al. note, these findings are consistent with chunking and template models of expertise as the differences between
experts and novices exist at very short
time limits, when searching through various options is not possible. The findings
are also likely to generalize to a wide range
of other domains of expertise. In addition to revealing these effects, the work is
very important because it develops novel
methodologies for assessing spatial relationships in chess positions and across
large datasets. Indeed, Leone et al.’s use
of big data to test specific hypotheses
about cognition is particularly innovative.
In future, these methods might provide
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further insight into how experts interpret
and represent space.
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